New DAC and RBAC certificate-oriented 
Introduction
Several authorization proposals have been introduced in the past. The most well-known scheme is the discretionary access control (DAC), where permissions are specified as access control lists (ACLs) within each resource guard. However, organizations change over time, and require a better model of updating access control policies. New access control mechanisms aim for a more distributed model for management and enforcement of privileges [6, 13] . This decentralized management requires a mechanism for delegating the privileges from the higher levels of an organization to its lower levels. This task can be accomplished making use of digital certificates [5, 8, 9] . In a general sense, a certificate is a record stating some information about the entity the certificate was issued to, and this information may be a role membership statement [19] , or an authorization. Authorization certificates bind a capability to an entity, and this capability can be used to determine what the entities are allowed to do.
The main idea behind delegation is that resource guards delegate the authorization-related tasks to specific authorities, which might be placed in different administrative domains [16] . These authorities can issue certificates delegating these permissions to other subordinates authorities, or to specific users. In this way, the structure generated reflects the authorization process.
In this paper we present the different opportunities which can be offered by delegation, especially from a management point of view. Moreover, we try to identify the existing challenges related to this access control model, and we make reference to some related works in order to analyze their contributions and to show how independent successful proposals can fail when they are combined in the same system. We have structured this analysis according to the topics of management, support for delegation chains, differences between authority and ownership, anonymity, certificate distribution, and revocation. The work is not based on any particular specification for authorization or attribute certificates.
Delegation and management structures

Privilege management
Authorization certificates provide a mechanism for establishing organizational structures which can be dynamically changed. The certificate structure can reflect the structure of an organization, but in contrast to classic access control lists (ACL) the control of the permissions contained in these certificates is widely distributed [2] . When delegation is used, most of the modifications to the global authorization policy do not have to be propagated to all the ACLs controlling the resources, and managing the certificates is a simple task since it is distributed among different entities controlling a small subset of permissions. Here, we show an example about how delegation can simplify ACLs, and therefore the resource guards. In §1 we present two ACLs for two different resource guards. The ACL of guard1 grants two permissions P 1 and P 2 to the public keys K A and K B . Other permissions are assigned to K D and K E by the ACL of guard2.
When a new public key K C must be authorized by both guard1 and guard2 to perform P 2 , using this approach, both ACLs must be modified to include (K C , P 2 ). Although this can be considered simple, things get tricky if we think that this update could involve several distributed ACLs. Consistency, network bandwidth, availability and denial of service attacks are some issues involved in previous DAC-based solutions. We can redefine the access control policy shown by §1 using delegation. Delegation can be expressed by means of specific labels (prop) stating that a particular key can issue new certificates for certain privileges. In §2 the same conditions stated by §1 are expressed using a delegation label and three authorization authorities K auth1 , K auth2 and
In order to authorize the public keys to access the resources, the authorities must issue certificates stating the permissions being granted. In §3 we include the certificates necessaries to emulate the authorization policy of §1. We decided omitting validity dates for simplicity.
In this way, providing to K C the permission to perform P 2 only involves the generation of a new authorization certificate (K auth2 , K C , P 2 ), and it does not require to update any existing ACL. Furthermore, this delegation scheme can be extended in order to truly create hierarchies reflecting the organizational structure. On the other hand, the management process can also be improved using RBAC (Role Based Access Control), which can be combined with DAC and certificate-based approaches in order to easily handle large numbers of users, as there are typically far fewer roles than users.
Delegation chains
As we mentioned above, rights can be redelegated to other keys, and these keys can redelegate them to a third one and so on. Therefore, delegation certificates constitute a chain where permissions flow from authorities to subjects (as is commented in [2] , in fact delegation does not create chains but graphs).
However, managing certificate chains can become a complex task. Authorization decisions based on long chains are not trivial since certificate distribution and retrieval can be computationally expensive. For example, from an attacker's point of view, delegation chains can reveal too much information about the organizational structure (authorities, resources, propagation conditions). Consequently, in some scenarios the information contained in these certificates can be considered as sensitive, thus requiring the provision of mechanisms limiting the disclosure.
A technique called certificate reduction [2] can overcome some problems related to confidentiality and efficiency. If we observe the certificate chain in §4, we can infer the certificate reduction presented in §5.
The new certificate is not stating a new permission, it is only a simplified version of the original chain, and it is issued for saving time during the certificate retrieval and verification. Its validity interval will be the intersection of the validity dates contained in the certificate chain.
However, it is worth noting that reduction is not always possible, and sometimes it cannot be performed without losing some features of the original certificates. Certificate reduction must be limited if the certificates forming the chain must be verified using on-line methods (like OCSP). Otherwise, validation of intermediate certificates will not be performed according to the on-line criteria.
Delegation control
For the sake of simplicity, in the examples that we have shown, delegation control has been performed using a boolean-based approach. There are several alternatives in order to control propagation. In [8] , a boolean-based approach is preferred against other proposals based on limiting the delegation depth. They argue that it is unable to predict the proper depth of delegation, and that there is no control on the proliferation of permissions on the width of the tree. Nevertheless, SPKI offers another way to control the propagation by using threshold certificates. For example, K A would like to propagate a permission P to K B but retaining the control over the further propagation of P from K B . By using a boolean control method, K A cannot enforce this requirement. However, K A can issue a certificate to the subject (2−of −2)(K B )(K A ), denying K B the propagation of P without the intervention of K A . This proposal, not only transforms K A in a central authority, but also does not impede a confabulation of principals which obtained a certificate of the form (2−of −2)(K any )(K A ) for the same permission.
In [4] , a fine-grained mechanism for constrained delegation is presented. Limitation is based on regular expressions establishing the organizational subtree that can be included in the delegation chain. Only the certificates issued for those entities included in the subtree are considered valid. Our opinion is that this proposal is a valuable step toward a better control of delegation, although can be inefficient in some scenarios where the organization structure is very dynamic and unpredictable.
Authority and ownership
One of the topics that has raised a good deal of controversy is: may a delegator also exercise the permissions being managed by himself?.
There is no general agreement about this issue and some authors believe that a delegator can also issue a new certificate for his own temporary keys in order to delegate himself the rights he cannot exercise. However, our belief is that a security administrator may or may not be part of the scope of his administration, and appropriate mechanisms should be provided in order to limit his authority.
Some authors make a clear distinction between having a permission and being able to manage a permission [18] . In general, the term authority makes reference to the creation and delegation of permissions, and the term privilege is used to cover both authority and permission. However, specification of independent policies for managing and using permissions is an open research field.
On the other hand, it is worth noting that the act of signing an authorization certificate does not invalidate any existing certificates. In this way, the issuer does not loose any of his permissions. Transfer is far difficult to implement than delegation since it involves the revocation of previous privileges and the issuance of new ones. Moreover, it is impossible to verify that an entity does not have a particular permission since negative statements are not allowed in most of the existing specifications for authorization certificates.
Anonymity
Section 2.2 introduced the problems derived from the disclosure of sensitive information contained in the certificates forming a chain. In fact, the certificate structure shows the relationships among the keys, and the keys might be easily mapped to real users when names are used.
In [3] two proposals are presented for preventing the tracking of keys: temporary keys and reduction. In this section we are going to present the basis of these proposals, we provide some refinements, and we explain their limitations.
Temporary keys
In order to impede tracking the keys, users can redelegate their rights to self-generated temporary keys, which will be used every time the user is requesting to perform an operation on a resource. In this way, the original public key, probably related to an identity certificate, can be hidden. In §6 we show a certificate chain where the user K U delegates a subset of permissions to a self-generated temporary key
where
It is worth noting that the certification chain will be valid only if K U has the privilege to further delegate P 1 (or a subset).
Support for temporary keys is hard to implement when techniques for constrained delegation are being used. As we mentioned in section 2, constraints are based on the specification of valid previously-known subtrees. Temporary keys are dynamically generated, and their values cannot be predicted.
We propose a solution to this problem in §7. As we can see, delegation is allowed to members of group G, which is defined by the entity K M . In order to enable a temporary key, K M must consider K T as a member of G.
Although this solution is valid, avoiding further modification on the delegation constraints and certificates, it involves the registration of every temporary key generated by the users. Therefore, a strong authentication of members of G and a mechanism for unique traceable identifiers must be provided. Consequently, using temporary keys for preventing the track of public keys must be subjected to strong authentication of those keys.
Reduction and trusted reducers
In the previous section we presented temporary keys as a mechanism to hide the activity of the users' private keys. However, sole use of temporary keys does not hide the intermediate keys in a chain of certificates. In §6 and §7, K U is still included in the chains. However, as we presented in §5, the reduced certificate contains only the first key in the chain (which verifies the certificate), and the last one. Here we present a scheme which does not require the participation of the root key to perform the reduction. We introduce the concept of trusted reducers as specific entities which are authorized to generate certificate reductions on behalf of a set of root authorities for a particular set of privileges. Trusted reducers can be set up to manage small sets of permissions, and can release the root keys from the task of reducing long chains of certificates.
Trusted reducers can be introduced as valid authorities by means of extended ACLs (ACLs containing information about the recognized reducers) or using authorization certificates issued by the root authorities. Both the extended ACLs and the certificate must specify the set of privileges that can be managed (reduced) by the trusted reducers. Certificate reduction by means of trusted reducers is a mechanism offered by our distributed credential management system [7] .
Certificate retrieval
Once the certificates have been generated, some of them will be made available for the rest of users, and a subset will be protected if they contain sensitive information. Therefore, retrieving the certificates necessaries to check whether an access request must be granted is not a trivial task. First, since certificates are widely distributed [21] among different issuers, repositories and users, we need to discover the location of these entities (generally named suppliers). Second, due to some certificates can include sensitive information, it is needed to provide access control methods to protect them [20] .
We can find in the literature several proposals for certificate retrieval [1, 10, 14] .
Traditionally, the requestor was responsible for obtaining the needed certificates from public repositories or smartcards. Nowadays, a client can get benefit in several ways from using a server to acquire certificates as input to the validation process [14] . In this context, the client is relying on the server to interact with repositories to acquire the data that the client would otherwise have to acquire using repository access protocols.
Moreover, discovery can involve several authorities or repositories, which can be located in different servers, and can be accessed more than once for the same query. This query can be directed by the guard, or can be performed using a distributed-approach where several suppliers are both requestors and suppliers, an architecture which has been proposed by several authors [12, 22] . In our opinion, much research efforts must be focused on optimizing this type of distributed resolution. One of the main problems is how to provide some control for redundancy of queries, since the delegation graph can contain repeated references to the privileges or groups defined by a particular supplier, and in absence of some kind of coordination data, some queries can be redundant. Additional issues that must be addressed are the disclosure of sensitive information and the support for certificate caching and management of revocations.
Revocation of delegation certificates
Authorization certificates can be revoked because the privilege given in the certificate does not hold any longer. Revocation is often considered regarding the simplest form of revocation, which makes a certificate invalid from the time the revocation is performed for all times in the future (a classification of revocation schemes is provided in [11] ). In order to support revocation to have prospective and retrospective effects, it is necessary to distinguish between the time a certificate is revoked and the time for which the associated privilege is revoked.
In [17] , the authors propose some mechanisms in order to reason about revocation according to propagation and dominance. Those mechanisms make use of certificates represented as:
The time-stamp makes reference to the time the privilege is created, and I is the interval for which the privilege P holds. Time-stamps are used in order to avoid that subsequent certificates could be considered as valid once the issuer has lost the authority, which might be accomplished by forging the time interval I. On the other hand, revocations are represented as:
They contain the id of the certificates which are subject of the revocation, and an interval [I] called the disabling interval. The main intention behind the disabling interval is the ability to revoke privileges that have been granted in the past.
For example, a disabling interval with a not-before date equal to the date contained in the time-stamp is used to revoke a particular certificate, but it will not affect any other existing certificates. This can be useful when a section chief is replaced by other person, since we want to maintain the existing authorization certificates of his subordinates. However, if we think that this person has abused his authority we need to delete not only his authority but also all those privileges that were delegated by him. This can be done using a disabling interval with a not-before date placed in the past.
In our opinion, these mechanisms have several drawbacks which can limit their deployment in a typical distributed system. First, it requires the use of trusted time stamps provided by a centralized service. Delegation by means of authorization certificates is an inherently distributed system which can be in conflict with this type of services. In fact, most of the authorization certificates are supposed to be generated in an off-line manner. On the other hand, revocation affects the certificates being identified by id. When the same privilege has been stated by different certificates, revoking one certificate does not disable the privilege itself [15] . Whether only one certificate or the privilege itself should be revoked may depend on each specific situation. For example, in order to make reference to the privilege being revoked, not only a serial number id must be included in the revocation but also the privilege P itself (or a subset of P ).
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented the different opportunities provided by a decentralized certificate-based approach for access management. We have identified the existing challenges related to this model, especially about management, support for delegation chains, differences between authority and ownership, anonymity, certificate distribution, and revocation. We have also outlined some interesting future research activities to be done.
